THE SHAKY HIGH MORAL GROUND OF POSTMODERNIST O ' ETHICS ' '

Holscher’s (2005) question, “Does postmodernism have a moral, ethical and values base?” appears as something of a paradox. But, as she rightly recognises, she is not the first to ask the question. In posing this question, Holscher is merely following a long line of scholars, including Bauman, whose Postmodern Ethics (1993) form the theoretical backdrop to her discussion, and Foucault, whose ideas have been more influential than Bauman’s on social work thinking (Chambon, Irving & Epstein, 1999; Hugman, 2003, 2005). In the social sciences Bauman (1995), Benhabib (1992), Foucault (2000) and Young (1990) have grappled with the implications of postmodernism for ethics and morality. In social work Atherton and Bollard (2003), Gray (1995), Hugman (2003, 2005), Parton (1994) and Walker (2001), among others, have critically examined the ethical implications of the so-called “postmodern turn” in social work. In this paper the authors draw on the work of Berman (2000) in trying to unravel the high moral ground of postmodernism; engage in a re-evaluation of the impact of key figures in modern Western philosophy such as Wittgenstein and, especially, Habermas; and consider the implications of their work for social work


INTRODUCTION
H6lscher's (2005) question, "Does postmodemism have a moral, ethical and values base?" appears as somethlng of a paradox.But, as ihe rightly recognises' she is not the first to ask the question' In p"ri"g this *questi,on, Hdlscher is merely following a long line of scholars, including Bauman, i"norJ postmodern Ethics (1993) form the theoretical backdrop to her discussion, and Foucault, whose ideas have been more influential than Bauman's on social work thinking (Chambon, Irving & Epstein, 1999; Hugman,2003Hugman, ,2005)).In the social sciences Bauman (1995), Benhabib (1992), Foucault (2000) and Young (1990) have grappled with the implications of postmodernism for ethics and morality.In social work Atherton and Bollard (2003), Gray (1995), Hugman (2003, 2005), parton 1te-e+; and Walker (2001), among others, have critically examined the_ethical implications of ihe so-called "postmodern turn" in social work.In this paper the authors draw on the work of Berman (2000) in trying to unravel the high moral ground of postmodernism; engage i' a re-evaluation of the impact of tey figures in modem Western philosophy such as Wittgenstein and, especially, Habermas; ind consider the implications of their work for social work.
THE DILEMMA OF POSTMODERN ETHICS Hdlscher (2005) reviews current debates on the role and function of ethical codes and standard setting in social work in postmodern conditions.She appeals for a "...discursive and non- essent--ialist Code of Ethics';(2005:237).In postmodern terms ethical judgments and processes remain open-ended, relational and context-specific.There can be no universal transcendental values such as human rights and social justice which apply to all people everylvhere.Thus there can be no talk about judgments regarding universal values, such as respect for persons, human rights and social justiCe; no application of such values or ethical precepts in local contexts, where cinpletely different cultwal i,rles and moralities might apply, and where there might not even be such terms in local languages.In short, there can be no uriversally agreed-upon norns or codes; rather, each norm or code needs to be discursively constructed in particular situations in a process which can never be complete.In this respect it makes no sense to talk about moral certainty, and so postmodernity is r""tr ar contributing to the loss of the "...ability of modern institutions to ensure the moral conduct of individuals" (Hdlscher, 2005:239) ' Ethics as moral philosophy makes no pretence to prescribe or enforce standards of moral conduct, but rather highlights the complexity of moral matters and the need for a deep undostanding of morality so that individuals might choose or commit themselves to behave morally (Gray, 1993,   1995, i996).Philosophically, the limitations of ethics have been well documented (Williams, 1985).The ;'postmodern turn" in ethics comes flom social theory or the transforming of ethics into a social science.This turn became evident in the 1960s, when utilitarianism established its dominance as the most acceptable ethical method by which the complex issues of modern pluralist societies could be addressed (Lovat, 2003(Lovat, , 2004)).It was an era that saw, in extreme instances, ethical decisions being made by committees using checklists and computing scores.The decision which scored highest was the decision enacted, regardless of any given sense of right and wrong according to thetaditional view.Where decisions of this sort determined matters of life and death, as in the hospital ethics committee, for instance, the law of the land would often fortify this utilitarian approach to right and wrong by deeming the decision of such a committee, using such a Social ll/orkMsatskaplike Werk 2 006 : 42 (3/4) method, to be the most powerful defence should a rnatter come to court.Especially when constituted by the requisite collection of stakeholder representatives charged by the institution with the task of determining ethical protocol, in the way in which Hcjlscher (2005) writes, the power of such a committee to re-write the rights and wrongs of the past has been determinative in many instances.
ETHICS AS A SCIENCE True to its social scientific base, the method of attaining agreement is not one of referring to traditional sources, no matter how revered, but o1'rational investigation, logical deliberation and democratic resolution.With the right software or.r hand, the results of such a process could be f'ed into a conrputer and the final decision produced electronically (Reamer's Ethics Audit, 2001).
Following hard on the heels of scientific scepticism and utilitarianism and laying the path for its emergence, came postmodernism which all but evaporated any hope that we might find grounds for some form of rloral certainty or universalist ethics.Mounted initially as a corrective to the dominance of science, it spread its wave of uncertainty to all systems of thought, erecting in its stead its own particularly dogniatic propositions.So tirnid did rnany become about taking a strong stand on an1'thing, lest one be accused of fuirdamentalism or breaching political correctness, that the hard issues of living in a complex, late modem, multicultural risk society have often not been conlionted.This is vividly brought home by Berman (2000) with reference to the assault of lhe Nev, York Times lountalist, Richard Bernstein, on the idcology of multiculturalism and oothe new political correctness moverrent", which he describes as a"Dictatnrship o/'Virtue" (2000:218).What began with the civil rights movement in the USA and with Martin Luther King Junior, narnely a struggle for black rights or rather equal rights for all, ended up as racisrn and so-called multiculturalisrn.It is an example used by Bernstein (1995) (and Berman) to show how the original movement "...slipped from its moorings and tumed into a new petrified opinion of the sort it was supposed to transcend" (Berman,2000:219).This'hew ism" is a "messianic program" which really is "monocultnralism" fbr "it does not take kindly to true difference" and, in many institutions (social work, politics, academia and other organs of government included): "(i0 has generated a kind of thought police who can easily frighten those who are scared of being labelled'racist' or'sexist'.Its alleged diversity is thus a Iiaud, because it imagines a world of enforced identical opinions.It denigrates notions of objectivity and achievement and celebrates the postmodern slogan that everl,thing is socially constructed.White European males are now seen as the'bad guys,' often required (if they wish to hold onto their jobs) to attend insensitive 'sensitivity sessions' or 'diversity training' that tell(s) them how to think and feel, and in which opinions difTerent frorn those of the trainers are not tolerated.'Respect for difference,' which is obviously a very good idea, has slipped into a secularized religion that will be imposed on everybody, and group affiliation is made into an ultirnate principle.'Virtue' is big here... the attitude one of rooting out sin.In many institutions across the United States, including those of higher education, the result has been to shut down the free exchange of ideas.Berrnan, 2000:219) Thus, says Berman (2000), thought proceeds in terms of slogans in this multicultural Brave New World, especially in so-called "alternative" institutions.The result is a Manichean type of world of oppressor and oppressed, with the proponents of postmodernism liequently adopting Michel Foucault's (1914) jargon of-"dominant discourse", "marginalized other" or "hegemonic curriculum", resulting in a "terrifying loss" in which we are "unwilling to defencl complicated fi.uth,t, (1t)7 4:219 italics addecl).For Bemstein, multiculturalism "...is an ideology that is unau'are "i'iir.ffrur an ideology" (Berman, 2000:219).Importantly, Berman (2000:220) seeks to use this as au examPle to show l.row: ,....paradigms move within the orbit of hierarchy, of power rclations, and that is why the New Truth becomes the Old Story in fairly short order ... rebcllion against one orthodoxy o',ty t.uar to another orthodoxy ... [thus] ... It takes no bravery to be a rnulticulturalist ..' ;ani1 ... Grants are typically awarded if the writer promises a'radical trzursfbrrnation of the bon,inunt paradigm'-... [rather than] 'This work might lead to modest changes in our way of thinking'."E,lsewhere Berrnan reminds us that "ism" stands fbr "incredibly short tnemory " (2000:225) such that with rc-conditioned thinking -in terms of the new paradigmgoes a new "politically correct" vocabulary and the "fetishizing" of ideas "turniug them into total explanations ... this t.n,l.n.y has reac'hed a kind of apogee", says Berman, "'.1i1 the frenzy of linding a 'new porudigrl.r,'a new consciousness ttrat wltt celebrate n-r1'th and ritual, ecology and transpersonal iry"f,iogy, and leave the dull ugly w'orld of sciencc, history, and patriarchal/industrial society f."t inA in ihe dust" (2000:220).One might place it under the'llachine to green" religious banner for "...mechanistic science, the ultimate evil, will uow be rcplaced by an'emerging planetary culture,' tlre ultimate good" (Berman,2000:221).This "holistic paradigm"' when it "does get institulionalized": ..... will give rise to a learning atmosphere that is cultish, zealous, and dogmatic' We now have large groups of people running around who can think systematically but not analyicaiy; *ho-ruu.about the 'sacred,' but haven't a clue as to the nature of scientific research; who chatter on about the 'tyanny of experts' when they have no experlise themselves.Cultural relativisrn is passed off as sophistication, when it is little more than sophistry; 'diversity' becomes a slogan, repeated with a new hlpnotic grrurting; quantum michanics is held up as a new philosophy, even thor.rghmost of its proponents can't do a single fieshman physics problern.ln an apt bit of satire of this kind of self-deception, the N;th) American psychologist S.I.Shapiro writes of the 'incredible beliefs' endemic to the field of transpersonal psychology, whose 'more advatrced members,' ... 'would of course never harbour such astonishing assumptions.'Berman, 2000:222-223) Berman (2000:223) hopes that this addiction to paradigms will give rise to some "halfir'ay houses" or "twelve-st"p p.ogru*r" to help people break out of their addiction which, like drugs and aloohol, provides ihorfterm ecstasy while "robbing them of their real life", not to mention that such "blind mythologizing", as in the transpersonal psychology example cited above, is politically disastrous.Foi Beiman this "transpersonal lnanny", which "tums history into archetypical psychology and takes hermeneutics ... and postmodernism to be the new truth" is "r"ury; '^i8..11an,2000:233).He cites Hannah Arendt's comment that "...1he presumplion of any great, hidden purpose in history that is ineluctably working itself out and that must inevitably lead io ro.. rp..ifi"d outcome (good or bad)'is one of the most virulent and dangerous diseases of the modein age"'(Berman, ZOOO,ZZ+1.Thus utopian thought or the belief that all conflict will be resolved and that Western civilization rvill finally come to rest is what Albert Camus referred to as 'lrostalgia for the absolute" (Berman, 2000:224).Citing Kant l.re says "...a revolution will never producJ true reform in ways of thinking.Instead new prejudices, like the ones they replaced, will serve as a leasl.r to control the greal unthinking mass" (Berman,2000.227).For Berman this aptly captures "the whole process of paradignr merry-go-round" (Berman,2000:227).
The new paradigm story of postmodernism is a classic case of an ideology-driven dubious logic, as is the story that "fbrninism will replace patriarchy" and "ecology rvill replace control of nature", treating these ideas as if they were scientific fact or prophecy of sorts (Bertnan, 2000;227).Whal tlrerr is the solution to this treadmill, to this game witlrout end?For Berman (2000:228), it is tc experience life "as it presents itself' and "to rcally grasp the fact that 'there' is not necessarily going to be very different from 'here'."And: "... to recognizethat what we need is not a drarratic transformation of reality and culture, but sirnply the willingness to live in this culture and reality as we work on the intelligcnt repair of present problems, without the hyre or bombast, and let the future take care ol itself.For that future, when it arrives, will have its problems, and we shall have to deal with them".(Berman, 2000:229)   Thus, neither postmodemism nor systcms theory -popular with thc ecology movernentcan save us, even though the latter might have better explanations tbr some tlpes of human interaction than other social and behavioural scicnce theories.Our "desire to rnake connections" is n4rat Comelius Castoraidis calls "the monster of unif ing rnadness" (Berntan, 2000:243).It is humorously displayed in the movie I (hecul) Huc:kabees.The problem is that proponeuts of these theories are zealots who behave like religious f?rnatics, placing their pseudo-scientiflc theories in a transcendent garb such that useflrl insights are caught up in a "garne of smoke and mirrors" (Berrnan, 2000:240).The same might be said of the theory of ethics which "finally tells us notltittg at all", for "no theory of ethics (or set of courtnunal rituals) is likely to rnake us behave decently" (Berman, 2000:240).What we need to recognise, as did Wittgenstein in his later years, is that "the solution to the problern of life... is to be seeu in the drsappearance of the problem" (Bertnan, 2000:202), in the living of life in the here and now as lilb to be lived as it is in the world as I found it (Du1fy, 1987).
While such approaches may have been suitable to their time, one would be inclined to think thal that time has come and gone.Less than ever are complex multicultr"rral, mnlti-valued and multifaith societies like those of South Africa, Australia, the USA, Canada and the LrK able to determine agreed ethical action by scientific audit.With increasingly significant populations of Islamic, Buddhist, Hindu, conservative Christian and "New Age" followers, a new pluralism is invading the space once dotninaled by the secularism of social science.In this space the trusted and largely unquestioned methods of yesteryear appear aseptic and incapable of aclclressing satisfhctorily the coucerns of its inhabitants.Loval (2003) suggests that, in this new pluralist society, hardcore utilitarianism and its ethical rlethods require modification and that this modification is apparent in the re-positioning occuning in recent bioethical research across a number of fields (Davis, 1996;Doukas & Berg,2001;Kalbian & Shepherd,2003; Macklin, 1995; Magnusson, 1996;Miller & Brody,2002;Robertson,200l;Wendler & Shah, 2003;Zoloth,2002).
The rest of this paper will be devoted to explaining this fundamental shift with reference to the insights of Wittgenstein and, especially, I{abennas.

WITTGENSTEIN AND RELATIVISM
There are many concepts used in postrnodemism enranating from Wittgenstein's philosophy, whom Berman (2000) describes as a "spiritual rromad"thc later Wittgenstein, anyway -'and "one of the greatest tl-rinkers of nrodern times" (Bennar-r,2000:192).Wittgenstein embodies what Deleuze calls "rhizomatic thinking"though ironically Deleuze saw no value in Wittgenstein's philosophywhich Berman describes as "paradox" or "spiritual nomadism", the sense of not .^incanwvhere prccisely because it understands that, in the most fundan-rental sense, there is iJatli no*t "re to go.As the twelfth-century Zen rnaster, Ilakuin, said "--.without a destination, I u, *u".lost" (Berman, 2000:192).In his later years Wittgenstein came to reject the grounding of ilut6"11uti"r in logicthe subject of his Tractacu,t, which he finished in 1915 but which only ",.,,r.or.a in print in 1922, intriguingly minus its rnystical material.I-Iere he acknowledges that Il..tuln (inditive) experiences are ineffable".Flence his mismderstood concluding sentet.rce: ,,Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must remain silent" (Rerman, 2000:194).Monk,s (1990) book on Wittgenstein Fiom which Berman (2000) derives this intuitionist rcading oit.,ir pt1itorophy traces it to Brouwer's influence.While influenced by Russell in his early work, ,frottly after the publication of Tractacus he became aware of Brouwer's rcjectiotl of "the idea that rnathernatics needed to be grounded in logic" -the complete opposite to the rationalist schoolor the lotion that there was a "mind-independent mathematical reality about rvhich mathetnatics can 'rake discoveries ... mathematics is not a body of facts but a constructiot.to1'the hutnatl mind" (Monk, in Berman, 2000:197).Thus says Berman, it is preciselythis direction, which one t.nightiall "psychological" or even "anthropological", that is evident in Wittgcnstein's latcr work.
Berman sees Wittgenstein as expressing in Tractacus his view that "...it ll'as only those thirrgs tlrat lay beyond scientffic scrutiny that were important in life" (Berman, 2000: 199 italics addcd)' It is in this context that one needs to view Wittgenstein's statement tl.rat "...the solutior.rto the ptobler-n of life is to be seen in the disappearance of the problem" as scientifically or ntcrlhematically deJined' The real issue is not whether there is a mind-independent reality or whether language obeys the rules of logic, but to understand those things which are beyond the purview of such questions, those things in relation to which such questions are meaningless.Thus Berman (2000:205) says that: "... to live with any degree of reason at allthe transcendence of the Tractacus (or any similar vertical/rationalist outlook) is absolutely unavoidable.For without some dcgree of verticality or objectivity, the language games and the hibalism of various thought communities cannot even be discussed because one would not be able to get inside of then.r to discuss them.Hence Wittgenstein's remark... less than a year befbre he died, (in 195 1) that the 'sense of the world must lie outside the world.ln it there is no value, it must lie outside all happening and being-so."

HABERMAS AND ETHICS AS TRANSCENDENT
Berman wants to drive home the point that any assertion of truth is necessarily a transcendent aotivity and Habermas (1912) would seem to agree when he postulates "self-reflectivity" as the supreme form of knowing.This is a form of knowing which is beyond that which can be formed liom empirical evidence and fiom human interaction.It is a knowing which comes ultimately from self-knowing in the way of the mystics of Judaism, Christianity and Islam (Lovat, 2006).For Habermas, this knowing builds on the knowing that comes liom empirical evidence and, more importantly, on the knowing that comes from human commtutication.In this, Habermas is building partly on the edifice provided by the later Wittgenstein who insisted that "...every language-game is only possible if one trusts something" (in Berman, 2000:206), thus "every language game presupposes that the communicating partners in the game take nulnerous facts for granted" (Berman, 2000:206).
Karl-Otto Apel -a Habermasian ally -would later emphasise that "criticism presupposes a transcendental framework in order to have a critical discussion at all" for "all exarnination or discourse takes place within a system" (in Berman, 2000:206) and it is importarrt to know which system you are in or are using when conducting your critical analysis (IJabermas, 1994).II one lras any reflective abilities, one would realise that to opt for a world of pure universalsas rat'ronalists or scientists do or one of pure local tribalismas deconstructionists and poshnodemists dois not iustified.We have to walk the tightrope betwecn the local and the universal, to lbllow what Wittgenstein callcd his "grief-' iu having to "walk on air" (in Berman,   2000:201).Thus Bennan (2000) concludes tl.rat on arr individual levcl, the probleur of these "two godheads" as Wittgenstein callcd them, "...disappcars because we are living ir-r a way that turns it into a niln-problem" (Berman, 2000:207), itrto understanding that this is.just the rvay things arc.We nriglrt just have to accept Baum an's aporesis (in l1 (ilscher, 2005), his term fbr "a confadiction thal cannot be overcome and whioh therefbre results in conl'lict that cannot be rescllved, coupled witlr an inability to admit such contradiclion indeed exists" and live rvith the truth that son.re problems are insoluble, that all civilizations are unstable, and that thcy all change in time.Perl.raps it is enough to know that the "global ecclucltny" and "transnational corporate hegenrony" cannot last lbrever, "no civiliz,ation does" (Berman,2000:244' see also Fernindez-Armesto,200 1)."To subnrerge tl.re entire planet in a business cultr"rre is den'reaning to hunran beings and inirnical to life itsell; and ... I am convinced that thcre is a lilb fbrce that knows beyond a doirbt that a litb circumscribed by commercial values and video display tcrrrrinals is no lif-e at all" (Berman, 2000:244).Nevertheless, "...there is no salvation on this pa1h, only questions, indications, possibilities" (Berman, 2000:245) and paradox.
Within the context of these connectiolrs, I-Iabernras deals with the limitations of Wittgenstein's version of linguistio analysis.While acknowledging the debt the philosophical world owes to Wittgenstein (1958, 1969), I{abermas refers to a certain lack of reflectivity in tl.re scherne, emauating cssentially liom its lailule to address the hermencutic dimension.This leads to an overly simple aualysis ol'the language games r.vhich characterise cross-cultural study.Thus says llaberutas (1988:137), "...reflective linguistic analysis accomplishes a cor.nmunication between difl-erent language games.Wittgenstein does not analyse (this) adequately ... With this we arrive at the licld of hermeneutics, which Wittgenstein did not enter".
For Habcrmas, knowing required a heavy hermeneutic dimensior.rwhich ultimately could iead to tlre forms of seltknowing that underpin his notion of praxis (Habennas, 1912, 1974) and of inter- sub.iective understanding that is at the heart of communicative competence (Habermas, 1984(Habermas, , 1987)).For him, this owed much to l{usserlian pliilosophy.Thus he says that "praxis philosophy renewed by phenornenology and authropology ... has at its disposal the tools of the Hr"rsserlian analysis" (Habermas, 1985:317) and "communicative reason makes itself felt in the binding force of intersubjective understanding and reciprocal recognition" (Habermas, 1985:324).ln tum, there are urore than accidental connections between Ilusserlian thought and Eisner's (1979) view that, epistemically, over-attentiveness to what can be contained by discourse can lead to what he ref-ers to as "discursive reductionism", a secondary rather thar.rprirnary lbrm of knowing in which knowing is assumed to be a product of discourse, in the way of the later Wittgenstein.For Eisner, it is the most hopeless by-product of, first, a cognitively obsessed, then, empirically obsessed, series o1'generations that we cannot now see the obvious truth that knowing precedes as often as fbllows lrorn, and is always a little rnore than, the words that contain it iust ask someone in love!Furthetmore, Ibr Eisner, it is this hopeless by-product that afflicts educational and social practices, so limiting all forms of educational and prof-essional training' includiilg their.assessm"nt pru.ti".r, a ty!."1 is easily known and most tcstahle, tlot to lnention nrost likely etlnocentrtc, "o'nt.ntiour,and liable to prolong inequity, lack of access and unethical action (Lovat' 2001)' In rhis context Habermas's understanding of the distinction bctween morals, valtles alld cthics is il";'.,;;il;"i,rg.eil.nv, as a followei of the Enlightenment tradition, Habertnas is a critical ii "".rri "File miaernity.As suggested above, he proposes that there are three ways in whiclt we ;;;;; k'ow rnotivatei by oui-cognitive l-ruman interests.Like Aristotle and Aquinas and the i.n-,'" fi,t" of Western philosophers ttiut follo* them, Ilabenr-ras places reason a1 the centre of lris :L;i".;"5;"r the means tlirough which we discern truth.At thc same time, he shorvs that rve havc i,,j",*a ilit.renttlpes of kno"wleclge for different purposes.I1e speaks about errrpirical-analytical I Jr-r.i"ntirt.-knowing, historical--hermeneutical knowing arrd emancipatory knowing, which he ,.rp*i".fyplaces in tliiee spheres, the obiective, social arrd subiective-llis distinction between ;;i;;r, ethi..s and morals u., .o*"rponding to these three spheres is particularly helplul in uiJ..rtunang the various ways in which we use these conce;rts in social work.
It nrakes selse that values are relative and culturally contillgent J'ctcts.As flabermas retniuds us, ;;;t;r" objective in the sense that they are part of the social fabric of all societies in the same way ihui norr11otiue assumptions are part of o.t."u..y day discussitlns -Ifabermas calls them speech u.,r. 1.fr.V are part of ihe language we use to express our ideus and communicate r'vith one another' It also makes sense that ethics, including professional ethics, belong in the soclrrl rcah.n, for they urise jior1, a social process of discussion -d d"but" wherein we agrce ol norms' both prolbssional and social, regarding what we see as right or just ibr the society in wllich we live and the profbssion to *tti"t'r *" are committed -in terms of the values we share that are common to our irofessiolal culture.Habermas calls this process whereby we reach agreement through rational iircrrsrion "commtmicative rationality".To use a concrete example, a code of ethics lbr social work is always the result of a dialogical process u'hich endsalbeit temporarilywhen agreement is reached.lt then becomes a "norm" of practice that social work pro{'essionals should aihere to the agreed-upon code.lmportantly, this implies that codes of ethics change over time as new influenc., in kro*l"dge and technological development lead to cultural changes.People shape codes of ethics in relation to the society in which they are embedded and change them as societies change.Hence codes of ethics are social and political professional statements.
Most on the button was Habermas's placernent of tlorais in the subjective realm, believing that our moral beliefs are deeply personal matters, for only we can know whether or not we arc being true to our values.truthfulness is to the subjective, tnoral realm as rightness is to the social, ethical realm, and llabermas places emphasis on htov'ing ottrselves as the persotl cloing lhe htowing, as the subject trying to discern the truth of what we come to know.Wlat better descripiion could theie be of 4elective practice"?In keeping with thc Thomistic philosophical tracliti^o1, Habermas grounds truth inthe feeling of personal treedom we feel when we are thinking and acting with integrity such that the truth sets us free, anchors us and makes us sure that our behaviouiis Ueing guiaea by our personal moralr beliefs and values.So this is the sellse in which Habermas uses the term "emancipatory knowing".He lbllows the Kantiar.rtradition in holding that if we can discem that something is morally good for humans, then it must apply to all human beings everym,here.This was Kant's (1964) categorical imperative.In this vein Ilabermas sees I Moral is being used here in its broadest sense to enconlpass not only our beliels about how individr-rals ought to be trea:ted, but also the social and political conditions for them to lead 1'r-rll nnd satisfliing lives (it echoes the Aristotelian notion of human flourishing).
Socia I lfo rk/M aats kapl i ke Werk 2006 : 42 (3/4) 1norals as universal only u''hen we can argue rationally that values like justice, honesty, integrrty, non-violence and so on are shared fbatures of our social reality which make social life possible and thus are good for all people everl"where.This too was Wamock's (1971) andSlrawson's (1974) argunent about minirnally agreed-upon values aoross culturcs and contexts.
Llabern.ras provides a conternporary understar.rding of values, ethics and rnorality which is totally cgr.rsistent with our thinking on values itr social lvork, where values are seell as culturally contingent, while still acknowledging some shared uriversals such that we can talk about a profession of social work to which we can contmit ourselves.This does not lnean that there are notl many di{ferent tlpes of social work, or social works, responding to local cultures ar.rd contexts, but lhat across these diverse cultures tl.rere are sclme values which we all share thal are er.rcompassed in our notior-rs of respect lbr others and social iustice.This is uot to say that Habermas has all the answers, lor there are gaps yet to be filled, not least the irnportance of ernotion in our reasonirtg processes (Nussbaum, 2001 ).
Sotne who miss a practical-mystical element in Habernras's thiuking see his comrnunicative rationality as highly proceduralised (Lovat, 2003(Lovat, , 2004)).It is true that Habermas wants to show that society must create conditions for fi'ee and operr discussion and debate such that all opinions might be heard and entertained in our inter-sr"rbjcctive.comrnunicative reasoning processes.This thinking seems entirely consistent with social work tlrinking and the idca that it is or"rr.job to make sure that everyone has a voice, including people w.ho are marginalised and discrirninated against.
In slrort, social work is broadly abovt making democ:racy u,ort through ensuring that there is a strong public realm, or what Haberrnas -following Husserlcalls a lilb-world and what we might call civil society, in which commutricative rationalityrational discussion or dialogue in terms of which we try to reach agreement can be exercised.Wrcre would society be without such open spaces and processes in compiling ethical codes?
Habermas's ideas are extremely practical, because they describe elements of our everyday interactions with one another and our attempts to reach understanding tl-rrough reasoned discussion, and they affirm our belief in the value of democracy and a strong civil society.Like Aristotle and Aquinas, he emphasises the importance of practical reasoning and builds his theory from his observations of our inter-subjective human relations.Thus, Aristotle's notion of phronesis, Aquinas's notion of synderesis and Habermas's notion of praxis all ernphasise that our moral sense and moral character is built up over time through right reason being applied to right actic'rn.We cannot become moral without engaging in everyday life and we cannol reach the truth until we are able to act with integrityfbllowing the virtuesconceived as good habits which build character and fortify us.Thus "right reason applied to action", Aquir.ras'scardinal intellectual virtue of prudence, includes moral considerations.
APPLICATIONS TO SOCIAL WORK AND SOUTH AFRICA Finally, Berman's (2000) "paradox" has a governing motif in Rilke's iniunction to "...live in the question and perhaps you will gradually, without noticing it, live along some distant day into the answer" (Berman, 2000:211).This is the tradition of the later Wittgenstein and Gilles Deleuze.The point is to realize that reality a,r rs was the mystery you were seeking all along.It challenges our constant quest for solutions and reuinds us that "depths are on the surlace" (Wittgenstein, 1969).After all our searching, we find what we were looking for right there "at horne" in our ordinary everyday lives.The truth is staring us right in the face, but we do not want to see it because we think we must dig for it, in complex er.npirical data and high-lcvel social science theorising.Wlro is to say lhat the grand solution or salvatiolt we seek might not prove to be.just as So cia I WorAM u ats kupli ke lVerk 2 006 : 42 ( 3/4) nnnressive as that which we seek to escape?The grass is never greener on the other side.Even iii-uputttt.iaSouth Aliica is beset by racism (Holscher, 2005)' What then can social work learn Ilom this?It could learn to see its work "in tenns of tlre immediate task at hand" (Berm an,2000:231); to work against social inequality in a way that does not "onrt.t"people's experience in terms of power but rather rhizomatically -"teaching the soul io tiu" ltr life' (Deleuze, in Berman, 2000:241) rather than trying to save itand compassionately iNurrbu,r-, 2001) _ realizingthat everyone is merely trying to make the best of their lives with if.,. a..f.they have been deali.This does not mean that we cannot work toward racial, gender and .ronotoi.equality, and a closer relationship with the environment and deal with diversity.We can ."ptor.thei'...dialectical possibilities... between horizontal and vertical aspects oflife.'.[and ur..pt ,nuq certain problems can never get solved, but only improved upon ... [and] there is some relief in knowing this" (Berman, 2000:238)' At heart South Allicans know the bitter truths that need confronting and they have a sound record in truth an{ reconciliation of which they can be proud.But romantic notions of rainbow nations and multiculturalism or pluralism or racial diversity prevent people liom conllonting the hard issues, choosing rather to skirt around thern with political correctness.This is not helping anyone.
Codes of ethics in social work will not solve such moral and ethical problems, nor will standards of education and practice, as Husband (in Hdlscher, 2005) rightly points out.The problems are structural and relational.They lie inter alia in poverty and under-development and racial and cultural difference * more especially in racial and cultural (mis)understanding and intolerance.No amount of moral theorising will wish these problems away and all that social workers can do is confront the problems they encounter each day, treat their clients and one another with respect, chip away at the bureaucracy, advocate for their clients' rights, engage with cultural and racial issues and name them for what they are, and work steadily through each small step to create a better albeit imperfect world.Codes of ethics can assist in this by focusing on micro-ethics,and by providing guidance to social workers on ethical practice.They are limited but uselul and n"""rru.y,given that social work wants to claim prof-essional status and all that goes with this.
Codes oi .ihi"t*. part of the modern trappings of professionalism and the quest for tu.riversal values and moral certainty.Social work is a values-based profession and it is this that constitutes itsuniversal identity.But codes of ethics cannot solveproblems or recognise contradictions; only people can do this.At best they are tools we can use, among other things, to guide practice and they are helpful tools if we use them well.

CONCLUSION
The paper has taken up the challenge provided by Holscher to re-evaluate the real irnpact of postmodernist ethics on relativising norrns and standards to the point that moral judgment t""o-., impossible.It has gone beyond Hdlscher's critique in exposing an enigma_ and insidiousness in postmodernist ethics in its high moral ground stance against anyone other than a postmodernist taking the high moral ground.This has the effect of clouding the moral areua and watering down the standards that often need to be applied to complex social situations, especially in troubled multicultural settings.The paper has unravelled some of the high moral gtound of postmodernism by utilizing the work of Berman.Furthetmore, it has engaged in re-evaluation of ihe impact of keyfigures such as Wittgenstein and especially Habermas who, even as an alleged neo-Marxist, proposed a groundbreaking ethical schema that fits well with the philosophical theological tradiiion of ihe West and could even be described as based in a notion of  K.A. 2003. Postr.r.rodernism . 1936.Summa theologica (tr L. Shapcote).London: Bums & Oates.I $ ARISTOTLE.1985.Nicomachean ethics (tr T. Irrvin).Indianapolis: Hackett.{ { ATHERTON, C.R. & BOLLARD,
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